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Abstract
Conditionalites, measures that a borrowing country should adopt to obtain loans from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), are pervasive in IMF programs. This paper estimates the effects of political
and economic factors on the number of conditions and on the size of fiscal adjustment requested in an
agreement. As found in the literature, political proximity of the borrowing country to the Fund’s major
shareholders has an important effect on the number of conditions. However, the magnitude of fiscal
adjustment requested by the IMF is strongly affected by the size of a country’s fiscal deficit but not
by political proximity. We also find a very small correlation between the number of conditions and the
requested fiscal adjustment.
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1 Introduction
The IMF is often criticized for its allegedly politically oriented behavior. In particular, pol-
itics are said to play a key role in determining IMF conditionalities, the set of policies that
borrowing countries agrees to uphold. The implication would be that a country’s connections
in the international political arena impact the level of austerity in IMF programs.1
Corroborating this view, one important finding in the literature is that the number of
conditions in an agreement between the IMF and a country is affected by its political proximity
to the Fund’s main shareholders. Since a fundamental component of IMF conditionalities is
a target for the government budget balance, Dreher and Jensen (2007) conclude that “for
∗We thank Carlos Eduardo Goncalves, Anna Ivanova, Enlinson Mattos, Emanuel Ornelas and seminar participants at Banco
Central do Brasil and the Sao Paulo School of Economics – FGV for helpful comments and suggestions. Guimaraes gratefully
acknowledges financial support from CNPq. Ladeira gratefully acknowledges financial support from CAPES.
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‡HEC Montreal, carlos-eduardo.de-almeida-ladeira@hec.ca.
1A similar argument is made for World Bank aid conditionalities. See Kilby (2009).
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countries that are not strongly allied with the United States, the IMF would restrain fiscal
and monetary policy expansion by setting tight conditions on loans.”
However, the number of conditions in an IMF program is not an accurate measure of its
level of austerity. This paper estimates the effects of political and economic factors on a
different measure of stringency of IMF programs: the size of fiscal adjustment requested in
an agreement between the IMF and a country’s authorities (henceforth the requested fiscal
adjustment). This is defined as the difference between the requested target for the government
budget balance (as proportion of GDP) and its pre-program value. We see the requested fiscal
adjustment as a better proxy for program austerity. The implementation of fiscal discipline
can be politically costly and often leads to social unrest.2 One of the most common criticisms
of IMF programs is indeed the prescription of fiscal consolidation, which could aggravate
economic downturns.3
In order to measure the political proximity of a country to the IMF’s major shareholders, we
turn to the records on the United National General Assembly (UNGA) voting patterns. The
political proximity variable consists of the proportion of occasions in which a country votes
in the same way as G5 members in UNGA.4 G5 countries (United States, United Kingdom,
Germany, Japan, and France) hold 36.19% of voting power in the IMF Executive Board,
exercising de facto control over lending decisions.5
We build a data set comprising information from 143 programs and 52 countries in the
period between 1999 and 2012. Our empirical analysis employs country fixed effects and time
fixed effects, so identification comes from variations in economic and political factors in a
given country. This is important because cross-country variation of default risk is strongly
affected by persistent country specific characteristics. While a five percent fiscal deficit might
be too large for a country but quite manageable for another, an increase in the fiscal deficit by
a couple of percentage points for a given country in a few years is more likely to correspond to
a larger need for fiscal adjustment. Nevertheless, random-effect estimations yield qualitatively
similar results.
2Passarelli and Tabellini (2013) analyze 19 OECD countries from 1975 to 2008 and show that a fiscal adjustment of 1% of
GDP is associated with an increase in the number of riots by 20%. Based on episodes of fiscal retrenchments in Europe during
the period 1919-2008, Ponticelli and Voth (2011) provide strong evidence of a causal relationship between spending cuts and the
occurrence of social unrest.
3The jury is still out on the short-term effects of fiscal adjustment. Based on a narrative approach, Guajardo et al. (2014) find
that discretionary fiscal consolidations have contractionary effects on GDP. In contrast, Alesina et al. (2015) construct multi-year
exogenous fiscal plans and provide evidence that spending-based adjustments have little or no negative effects and Diniz (2016)
finds short-lived contractionary effects for tax increases only. In addition, the fiscal multiplier seems to greatly depend on country
characteristics (Ilzetzki et al. (2013) find negative multipliers when debt levels are high) and on expectations about future policy
adjustment (Corsetti et al. (2012) find that expected spending reversals alter the short run effects of fiscal policy).
4Voting patterns in UNGA have been found to matter for a variety of issues, including: the allocation of foreign aid (Alesina
and Dollar (2000)); patterns on international trade (Umana Dajud (2013)); and connections between domestic and international
politics (Dreher and Jensen (2013)).
5Data on country’s voting shares are available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx.
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As found in the literature, political proximity of the borrowing country to the Fund’s major
shareholders (the G5 countries) has an important effect on the number of fiscal conditions
in an IMF agreement: countries closely aligned with the key members of the Fund receive a
significant reduction in the number of conditions. However, the fiscal adjustment requested by
the IMF is strongly affected by the size of a country’s fiscal deficit, whilst political proximity
to G5 countries has no significant effect on this measure. The results for both measures of
stringency of conditionalities are thus very different, but that is because they are completely
different indicators: the correlation between the number of fiscal conditions and the requested
fiscal adjustment is only 0.06 in our sample.
The effect of fiscal variables on our measure of stringency of IMF programs is large. An
increase in the fiscal deficit by one percentage point increases the required fiscal adjustment by
around 0.5%. The required fiscal adjustment is thus mainly determined by a country’s fiscal
outlook. According to our results, the stringency of IMF conditionalities is mostly driven by
economic factors, not by politics.
The remainder of the introduction discusses the related literature. Section 2 then describes
the data, Section 3 presents the econometric methodology and Section 4 shows the results.
Finally, Section 5 draws some conclusions.
1.1 Related Literature
A branch of the empirical literature about the IMF focuses on the determinants of program
participation and the design of conditionalities.6 Much of this work studies whether foreign
policy interests of the major members of the Fund affect its lending decisions. The widely
used indicator for the degree of political affinity between a country and the Fund’s main
shareholders is a compliance index in the voting pattern at the UNGA.
Thacker (1999) provides one of the first empirical analysis of the political influence of
the United States (US) over IMF lending decisions. Considering similarity on key votes, the
results strongly support the argument that moving towards US political preferences raises the
probability of a country getting a loan.7 Andersen et al. (2006) study the allocation of loans
by the IMF as a mechanism design problem and obtain that loan allocation probabilities are
increasing in the size of political concessions.8 This theoretical prediction is corroborated by
their empirical analysis. The results in Barro and Lee (2005) and Presbitero and Zazzaro
6The theoretical literature on the reasons for IMF conditionalities is surveyed in Dreher (2009). In Marchesi and Thomas
(1999), IMF conditionalities act as screening device. In Fafchamps (1996), Gonçalves and Guimaraes (2015) and Guimaraes and
Iazdi (2015), conditionalities help to deal with time inconsistency problems.
7According to the US State of Department, key votes are “votes on issues which directly affected United States interests and
on which the United States lobbied extensively.”
8They measure political concessions by the difference between the overall voting record of a country and the votes on issues
considered important by the US Department of State.
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(2012) also suggest that political proximity affects Fund’s decisions. Both papers find that
countries voting more frequently with the US at UNGA have a greater likelihood of getting
a package approved, with larger loans.9
Many empirical papers find that IMF loans and conditionalities are responsive to the
economic interests of the Fund’s major shareholders and to the domestic political environment
of borrowing countries. Previous research has found evidence that private financial institutions
of major member countries pressure the IMF for more “bank-friendly” conditions when their
financial interests are at stake (Gould (2003)), and that IMF loans are larger for countries
highly indebted to American commercial banks (Oatley and Yackee (2004)) and with intense
trade linkages to the US (Barro and Lee (2005)). Regarding the role of domestic politics,
Caraway et al. (2012) develop a measure for the stringency of labor market conditionalities,
and find that countries with stronger domestic labor power receive softer conditions, while
Beazer and Woo (2015) presents evidence that a higher number of structural conditionalities
jeopardizes reform implementation by reducing government’s policy space for building pro-
reform coalitions.10
Closer to our paper is the work of Dreher and Jensen (2007). Their empirical analysis
evaluates whether the number of conditionalities in an IMF agreement depends mainly on
domestic economic factors (real GDP growth, inflation rate, government budget deficit, among
others) or on political proximity to the US (and G7 countries). The results indicate that
political proximity is the most important determinant of conditionalities: countries closely
aligned with the United States sign deals with a significantly smaller number of conditions.
Similarly, Dreher et al. (2009) estimate whether temporary elected members of the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) receive favorable treatment from the Fund. They find
that those members indeed receive a significant reduction in the number of conditionalities.
Building on Dreher and Jensen (2007), Woo (2013) finds that political proximity to the US,
also proxied by the voting compliance variable, leads to less financial-sector conditions, though
the effect on the number of fiscal conditions is not statistically significant.
In a related contribution, Stefani (2014) also uses a measure of the requested fiscal ad-
justment as a proxy for the stringency of IMF conditionalities, but her objective is different
from ours: she studies how domestic politics and the quality of institutions influence the fiscal
adjustment requested by the IMF. Since her variables of interest move slowly, she employs a
random effects estimation, so identification is given by cross-country variation. She finds that
9Reynaud and Vauday (2009) employ a different methodology (common factor analysis) and also find support for the argument
that geopolitical considerations help to explain the observed variability in IMF loan sizes. To proxy the geopolitical importance
of countries, they use variables related to military power, nuclear energy endowment, and energetic resources.
10The stringency of conditionalities in Caraway et al. (2012) consists of a weighted sum of the number of conditions, with
higher weights given to prior action and performance criteria conditions. In this paper, political proximity to the US has an
unexpected positive correlation with stringency of conditionalities.
4
domestic political conditions indeed shape the magnitude of the requested fiscal adjustment,
which is softer for countries where the risks of social unrest are more pronounced.
2 IMF lending and the data
IMF resources are made available under a package that specifies the amount of resources
lent to a country and the economic policies to be adopted. The Fund offers several lending
instruments, which are designed and made available according to the particularities of the
borrowing country and the sources of economic instability. Concessional facilities carry zero
interest rates, and are tailored to assist low-income countries, while non-concessional loans are
subject to IMF’s market-based interest rates and are available for countries in proportion to
their quota values. Packages for low-income countries often emphasize other goals rather than
macroeconomic adjustment, such as measures for poverty reduction and long-term growth
reforms.11
The terms of a loan are negotiated between a country’s authorities and the Fund’s staff.
This process culminates in a Letter of Intent and a Memorandum of Economic and Financial
Policies, where the targets and goals of the program are described. These documents are
then submitted to the Executive Board, which decides whether the program is approved or
not. Once approved, the resources are released (usually in phased installments), and the
Fund starts to monitor program implementation. If the evaluation of the Executive Board
concludes that the program is off track, it can be suspended temporarily or permanently.
Conditionalities can take different forms:
• Prior actions: measures that a country is expected to adopt before the approval of an
arrangement. According to the Fund, these conditions are necessary to be adopted right
away in order to increase the chances of program success. Elimination of price controls
and the passage of an agreed fiscal budget are examples of prior actions.
• Performance criteria: these conditions include quantitative targets for macroeconomic
variables under the control of national authorities. In case of non-compliance with perfor-
mance criteria, the Executive Board needs to grant a waiver before a new disbursement
is released. A maximum level of government borrowing is an example of a quantitative
conditionality.
• Structural benchmarks: usually non-quantifiable reform measures which are essential to
achieve program goals. Structural conditionalities do not require a waiver in case of
11A detailed description of all types of credit lines offered by the IMF can be found at https://www.imf.org/external/np/
exr/facts/howlend.htm.
5
non-compliance. Congressional approval of a fiscal responsibility law is an example of a
structural benchmark conditionality.
2.1 The data
Our data comes mainly from the Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA) of the IMF,
which contains information about conditionalities, program goals and monitoring. The sample
consists of 143 programs approved between 1999 and 2012 for 52 countries with at least 2
programs in the period.12 Our analysis focuses on the initial program design, mainly because
this is when the broad outlines are defined. As an example, the Appendix shows the Letter
of Intent of a Stand By Arrangement approved for Greece in 2014.
Ideally, we would like to compare the fiscal balance targeted by the program and the
counterfactual fiscal balance. However, the lack of data on historical budget plans limits the
scope for computing the fiscal balances we would observe in the absence of IMF programs.
One alternative would be to rely on forecasts for the fiscal balance prepared by the IMF’s
World Economic Outlook (WEO) reports, selecting projections for a particular country before
a program was signed. However, for our sample of countries, such data is very limited.13
Owing to these difficulties, our proxy for the requested fiscal adjustment is simply the
difference between the requested fiscal balance and the observed one before the agreement is
signed. We take from MONA the envisaged overall government balance for each year of the
program. For country i with a program approved in year t, our measure of the requested
fiscal adjustment is the difference between the envisaged overall government balance (as a
percentage of GDP) by the end of the second year (t+1) of the program and the pre-program
level (t− 1):
Fiscal Adjustmenti,t = Requested Fiscal Balancei,t+1 − Actual Fiscal Balancei,t−1
We adopt the target for the second year in our baseline calculations as it allows us to
compare fiscal adjustment in programs with different time periods. For instance, a fiscal
adjustment of 5% of GDP along the 3 years of a program is arguably easier to be implemented
(economically and politically) than the same 5% adjustment for just 1 year.
MONA classifies conditionalities according to their type (prior actions, quantitative perfor-
mance and structural benchmarks) and the targeted sector (fiscal, monetary, financial reform,
among others). We use the total number of conditions and the number of fiscal conditions as
12Since we use country fixed effects in our baseline estimation, countries with only one program provide no useful information.
13Moreover, there is some evidence suggesting that WEO’s forecasts are also influenced by the political proximity of a country
to the US(Dreher et al.; 2008).
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dependent variables in some of our regressions.
Other economic explanatory variables come from WEO, World Bank and Unctad. The
political proximity variable describing the percentage of votes in which the borrowing country
votes in the same way as G5 countries in a given year at the UNGA comes from Strezhnev
and Voeten (2013). A complete description of our data is available in the Appendix.
2.2 Data description
Our sample consists on an unbalanced panel of 143 IMF Programs and 52 countries. As Table
1 indicates, countries have repeated participation along the sample period. On average, each
country in the sample takes part in almost 3 programs with the Fund.
Table 1: Number of Programs and Countries
Number of Countries Number of Programs Total Number of Programs
25 2 50
17 3 51
8 4 32
2 5 10
Programs can last from one to four years, with the majority lasting three years, as shown
in Table 2.14 On average, IMF programs define a fiscal adjustment of 0.78% of GDP and
20 conditionalities. Fiscal conditions are a common feature in programs, representing (on
average) 39% of all conditions included in a package. A “ceiling on the overall stock of central
government debt” is an example of fiscal quantitative conditionality, while the preparation of
a “privatization plan for the divestment of state assets and enterprises with the aim to raise at
least 1 billion euro a year during the period 2011-2013” is a fiscal structural condition.15 Table
2 also indicates a significant variability in the size of fiscal adjustment between programs. The
magnitude of fiscal adjustment significantly fluctuates in time, as Table 3 shows. In the wake
of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, programs approved in 2007 defined an average target for
fiscal balance of −3.17% of GDP for the next year, and our measure of fiscal effort indicates
an “adjustment” of −5.31% of GDP. However, with a struggling world economy, an even
worse fiscal performance could be expected for 2008 in the absence of a program. In this case,
our measure of fiscal adjustment is surely underestimating the real fiscal effort requested by
the IMF. However, this problem is at least partially mitigated by the use of time dummy
variables, which control for common shocks affecting different countries in a given year.
14There is one exception, one 8-year program in our sample.
15These examples were taken from the Greek Letter of Intent (December 8, 2010), avaliable at https://www.imf.org/external/
np/loi/mempub_new.asp.
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Table 2: Fiscal Adjustment and Conditionalities by Programs
Fiscal Adjustment N. of Conditions N. of Fiscal Conditions
Years of Program Number of Programs Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1 27 1.52 2.48 20.67 14.98 6.33 4.64
2 25 1.05 2.51 21.24 10.42 7.24 3.87
3 88 0.43 3.55 19.56 9.17 8.35 3.89
4+ 3 2.11 2.27 16.67 13.20 7.33 5.51
All Programs 143 0.78 3.20 20.00 10.68 7.75 4.11
Table 3: Average Fiscal Adjustment by Year of Program Approval
Year of Approval Actual Fiscal Balance (T-1) Fiscal Balance (T+1) Requested Fiscal Adjustment
1999 -2.32 -2.96 -0.64
2000 -2.74 -3.13 -0.39
2001 -4.62 -2.98 1.64
2002 -3.53 -3.16 0.37
2003 -3.91 -2.78 1.13
2004 -3.17 -2.96 0.21
2005 -2.05 -0.82 1.23
2006 -2.42 -0.29 2.13
2007 2.14 -3.17 -5.31
2008 -2.92 8.28 11.20
2009 -3.55 -3.34 0.21
2010 -4.94 -4.54 0.40
2011 -4.25 -4.35 -0.10
2012 -4.26 -3.23 1.03
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2.3 Number of conditionalities and fiscal adjustment
Figure 1 plots the number of fiscal conditions and the requested fiscal adjustment for each
IMF program. There is no significant correlation between the two measures of stringency of
conditionalities. A given number of fiscal conditions can correspond to high, moderate or soft
requirements for fiscal adjustment.
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Figure 1: Correlation between the number of fiscal conditions and fiscal adjustment
The absence of a significant correlation between the two measures of fiscal conditionalities
remains when we eliminate the noisy effects of time. When we regress each measure of fiscal
conditionality against time dummy variables and focus on the residuals, we actually observe a
(very small) negative correlation between them. That is plotted in Figure 2 in the Appendix.
Conditions are very different in scope. Some of them do not require any economic or polit-
ical effort by the borrowing country, while others involve domestic political battles, and pro-
duce significant institutional and economic changes once implemented (Lamdany and Hamann
(2008)). In a program approved in 2002, Peru’s authorities agreed on the privatization of its
electricity generation company, a measure which clearly involves difficult domestic negotia-
tions. On the other hand, when Lesotho obtained an assistance package in 2001, it agreed to
release its monthly budget execution report (a particularly simple condition to fulfill). These
examples indicate the potential problems of considering all conditions alike, and shed some
light on the absence of a significant correlation between the two measures of conditionalities.
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3 Empirical methodology
In order to investigate the determinants of the requested fiscal adjustment, we run the fol-
lowing linear regression:
FiscalAdjustmenti,t = βXi,t−1 + δV otesi,t−1 + γZi,t−1 + αi + νt + i,t, (1)
where FiscalAdjustmenti,t is the size of the requested fiscal adjustment for country i with a
program approved in year t.
In the regressions with the number of conditions (either total or fiscal) as the dependent
variable, the estimation employs a Poisson specification for the conditional mean:
E[Numberi,t|αi,Wi] = exp(βXi,t−1 + δV otesi,t−1 + γZi,t−1 + αi + νt), (2)
where E is the expectations operator and Wi is the vector of all explanatory variables on the
right-hand side of the equation.16 The dependent variable Numberi,t counts either the total
or the fiscal number of conditionalities for country i with a program approved in year t.
The vector Xi,t−1 contains the standard economic variables used in the literature of IMF
conditionality and fiscal consolidation. These are: (i) GDP growth; (ii) current account
balance; (iii) government consumption; (iv) tax revenue; (v) monetary expansion; and (vi)
gross public debt.17 These variables are lagged by one year in order to reduce the problem of
reverse causality.
The variable V otesi,t−1 measures how frequently country i and G5 countries voted in the
same way at the United Nations General Assembly. Hence V otesi,t−1 represents the political
proximity of country i to G5 countries in a given year t − 1. As we use a within country
estimator in our baseline regressions, what matters is not the absolute political proximity,
but the change in political alignment.
The vector Zi,t−1 includes variables measuring the economic connections of a country to G5
members: the ratio of the country’s bilateral trade with G5 members to the country’s GDP
16To estimate the model, the statistical software Stata transforms equation (2) to remove the individual fixed effects. Thus,
we obtain a multinomial distribution for Numberi,t, as follows:
E[Numberi,t|αi,Wi, Numberi] =
exp(βXi,t−1 + δV otesi,t−1 + γZi,t−1 + νt)
T∑
r=1
exp(βXi,r−1 + δV otesi,r−1 + γZi,r−1 + νr)
Numberi, (3)
where Numberi =
T∑
r=1
Numberi,t is the number of conditionalities in a program for country i over the entire sample. Estimation
of equation (3) is then carried using conditional quasi-maximum likelihood (QML).
17All variables are measured as fractions of GDP, except GDP growth and monetary expansion.
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(following Barro and Lee (2005)) and G5 bank’s claims over the borrowing country’s GDP
(following Presbitero and Zazzaro (2012)). These papers have found that economic linkages
of a country to major members of the Fund influence lending decisions. We empirically
investigate whether they matter for our measures of conditionalities.
The term αi captures any time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Our identification
strategy thus relies in within-country variation in variables defined in the right-hand side of
(2) and (1). In particular, the effects on the number of conditionalities and size of fiscal
adjustment are estimated from changes in the economic and political variables for a country
between programs approved in different years. In this sense, each country serves as its own
“control group”.
A fixed-effect regression is particularly suitable for this problem because countries with
similar levels of public debt and deficit may have very different propensities to default. Woo
(2003) provides evidence that institutional and political variables largely account for cross-
country differences in the size of public deficits. The empirical results in Fatás and Mihov
(2003) relate the discretionary use of fiscal policy to the political and institutional environ-
ment. Norambuena (2014) shows that default risk variation across countries can be mainly
attributed to persistent specific country characteristics. Fixed effects capture each country’s
“natural” propensity to default on its debt and to adopt a particular type of fiscal policy.
Indeed, some countries can sustain higher levels of debt and are less prone to default
on their obligations owing to unobserved characteristics. Assuming these countries find it
easier to smooth the burden of taxation over time, we could expect a softer requirement of
fiscal adjustment for these countries. However, in this case, a regression without fixed effects
could yield a spurious negative impact of public debt over the size of fiscal adjustment and
incorrectly lead us to conclude that countries with higher levels of sovereign debt are required
to adjust less when in reality a smaller adjustment is requested from them because their sound
institutions make them less prone to default.18
The term νt corresponds to time fixed effects. The inclusion of time dummy variables helps
to control for fluctuations over time in the economic variables that affect fiscal balances of
all countries. For example, in the years surrounding the global financial crisis, IMF programs
required smaller fiscal balances from requesting countries. Time fixed effects reduce the
noise in our fiscal adjustment variable, partially eliminating the cyclical component of fiscal
balances. The term i,t is a random error.
We also include standard controls likely to correlate with fiscal variables: trade openness,
defined as the sum of exports and imports over GDP, and two demographic variables, namely
18Corroborating this argument, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) show that thresholds for external debt sustainability are much
lower for emerging market economies than for industrialized countries.
11
the share of the population aged between 15 and 64 years and the share of people above 65
years old.19
Summary statistics for all the variables in our regressions are presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Max Min Observations
Number of Conditions 20.0 10.7 74 5 143
Number of Fiscal Conditions 7.8 4.1 22 1 143
Fiscal Adjustment 0.78 3.2 10.1 -21.6 143
Votes (%) 48.7 16.4 82.9 0.0 143
Current Account Balance (%GDP) -6.3 6.6 13.7 -47.2 143
Monetary Expansion (%) 18.9 44.6 514.1 -50.8 143
GDP Growth (%) 3.6 4.8 33.6 -14.8 143
Public Debt (%GDP) 66.6 51.6 381.1 12.3 136
Government Consumption (%GDP) 28.2 9.2 53.8 13.6 135
Tax Revenue (%GDP) 24.7 8.7 46.9 11.7 139
Trade with G5 (%GDP) 14.0 11.9 67.3 0.0 126
G5 Bank Exposure (%GDP) 28.2 68.09 516.9 0.06 131
4 Results
We now show how the different measures of conditionalities respond to the economic and
political factors detailed in the previous section.
4.1 The determinants of number of conditions
Table 5 presents the results for the total number of conditions (left columns in each case) and
number of fiscal conditions (right columns). In the first model, only economic variables are
considered. In this case, monetary expansion and government consumption are statistically
significant, but with an unexpected sign. We then include Votes in all other specifications.
Model 2 shows that an increase in political proximity of a given country to G5 members is
associated with a reduction in the number of conditions, with the partial effect being larger for
fiscal conditions. In terms of magnitude, increasing vote compliance by one standard deviation
reduces the total number of conditions by 11.2% and the number of fiscal conditions by 24.4%.
In Model 3 and Model 4, we separately add the variables measuring the economic linkages
of a country to G5 members: Trade with G5 countries and G5 Bank Exposure. Results do
not provide suggestive evidence that the number of conditions is affected by the extent to
which a country is economically important for the major IMF’s shareholders. Votes remains
19These variables have been included in previous studies (e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2004)).
12
Ta
bl
e
5:
T
he
de
te
rm
in
an
ts
of
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
co
nd
iti
on
s
M
od
el
1
M
od
el
2
M
od
el
3
M
od
el
4
M
od
el
5
To
ta
l
Fi
sc
al
To
ta
l
Fi
sc
al
To
ta
l
Fi
sc
al
To
ta
l
Fi
sc
al
To
ta
l
Fi
sc
al
Vo
te
s
-0
.0
07
*
-0
.0
17
**
*
-0
.0
09
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
09
**
*
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
12
**
-0
.0
15
*
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
08
)
C
ur
re
nt
A
cc
ou
nt
0.
00
2
0.
00
9
0.
00
2
0.
00
8
-0
.0
06
0.
00
5
0.
01
0
0.
00
7
0.
00
1
0.
00
2
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
M
on
et
ar
y
Ex
pa
ns
io
n
-0
.0
03
**
*
-0
.0
03
**
-0
.0
00
3*
**
-0
.0
03
**
*
0.
00
2
-0
.0
00
3
-0
.0
03
**
*
-0
.0
03
**
*
0.
00
3
0.
00
3
(0
.0
00
8)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
00
8)
(0
.0
00
9)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
00
8)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
05
)
G
D
P
G
ro
w
th
-0
.0
03
0.
00
9
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
29
**
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
08
0.
00
5
-0
.0
29
**
0.
00
2
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
2)
G
ov
.C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
-0
.0
35
*
-0
.0
25
-0
.0
39
*
-0
.0
39
**
-0
.0
52
**
-0
.0
32
-0
.0
68
**
*
-0
.0
61
**
*
-0
.0
89
**
*
-0
.0
64
**
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
3)
Ta
x
R
ev
en
ue
0.
01
2
0.
01
7
0.
01
4
0.
02
2*
0.
02
4
0.
00
6
0.
02
3*
*
0.
02
5*
0.
05
0*
**
0.
03
8
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.1
)
(0
.0
3)
Pu
bl
ic
D
eb
t
0.
00
1
0.
00
06
0.
00
1
0.
00
04
0.
00
1
-0
.0
00
3
0.
00
1
0.
00
09
0.
00
2
0.
00
09
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
02
)
Tr
ad
e
w
ith
G
5
0.
00
02
0.
00
6
-0
.0
18
-0
.0
13
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
G
5
Ba
nk
Ex
po
su
re
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
05
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
07
)
C
ou
nt
ry
Fi
xe
d
Eff
ec
ts
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
T
im
e
Fi
xe
d
Eff
ec
ts
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
12
4
12
4
12
4
12
4
10
7
10
7
11
2
11
2
95
95
C
ou
nt
rie
s
46
46
46
46
39
39
42
42
35
35
Ps
eu
do
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
19
0.
12
0.
20
0.
14
0.
14
0.
11
0.
25
0.
17
0.
21
0.
13
N
um
be
r
T
ot
al
an
d
F
is
ca
l
co
un
t
th
e
to
ta
l
an
d
th
e
fis
ca
l
nu
m
be
r
of
co
nd
it
io
ns
in
a
pr
og
ra
m
w
it
h
th
e
IM
F
.
T
he
P
oi
ss
on
m
od
el
is
es
ti
m
at
ed
by
qu
as
i-
m
ax
im
um
lik
el
ih
oo
d.
H
ub
er
-W
hi
te
ro
bu
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
pa
re
nt
he
si
s.
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
le
ve
ls
:
*
p<
0.
1,
**
p<
0.
05
,
**
*
p<
0.
01
.
13
statistically and economically significant in Model 4. Finally, we include all economic and
political variables in Model 5. We lose some observations, but we still observe that a greater
political proximity to G5 countries is correlated with fewer conditions. The impact is large,
since one standard deviation increase in voting compliance is associated with 18% and 21%
fewer total and fiscal conditions, respectively.
In sum, the number of conditions seems to be systematically influenced by politics. On
the other hand, among the economic variables, only monetary expansion and government
consumption are statistically significant in our specifications, and with unexpected signs.
Therefore, our results are closely related to those obtained by previous empirical work such as
Dreher and Jensen (2007), Dreher (2009) and Woo (2013). As a concrete example, consider
the case of Chad, whose program in 2005 included 11 fiscal conditions. In that year, Chad
voted identically to G5 countries in UNGA in only 8.6% of the occasions. According to our
results, an increase in voting compliance to match the sample average (around 48%) would
reduce the number of fiscal conditions to around 6, all else constant.20 This result is similar
to the obtained by Dreher and Jensen (2007) – they also find a particularly large reduction
in the number of fiscal conditions.
4.2 The determinants of required fiscal adjustments
We now estimate (1) with the fiscal adjustment requested by the IMF as the dependent
variable. Table 6 brings the main result of the paper. The fiscal adjustment required by the
IMF is primarily driven by economic factors. As the coefficients on government consumption
and tax revenue ratios indicate, the size of fiscal adjustment is increasing in the deterioration
of the fiscal balance.
The results are consistent with an IMF policy that aims at bringing a country’s fiscal
balance closer to its historical average. An increase in fiscal deficit by one percentage point
increases the required fiscal adjustment by around 0.6% in the baseline regression. The result
remains strong in all other specifications. We lose a number of observations when all variables
are included in Model 5, but the coefficients are still large and significant.
The results support the view that the rationale behind fiscal consolidations in IMF pro-
grams is the restoration of budget discipline. One should expect deeper fiscal consolidation
when public spending is larger than usual or when tax revenues are at a particularly low level.
There is no reason to expect that the optimal fiscal deficit should be constant over time, so
we should indeed expect a coefficient smaller than one, but substantially larger than zero.
That is exactly what we obtain.
20The average partial effect of Votes on the number of fiscal conditions is 23%.
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Table 6: The determinants of the requested fiscal adjustment
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Votes 0.061 0.079** 0.061 0.083*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Current Account -0.004 -0.0004 -0.110* 0.069 -0.121
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09)
Monetary Expansion -0.009 -0.008 -0.047* -0.007 -0.050*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.02) (0.005) (0.03)
GDP Growth -0.027 0.016 -0.042 0.003 -0.030
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Gov.Consumption 0.542** 0.587** 0.309* 0.575** 0.396*
(0.24) (0.24) (0.18) (0.27) (0.21)
Tax Revenue -0.710*** -0.732*** -0.390** -0.697*** -0.428**
(0.21) (0.21) (0.16) (0.19) (0.17)
Public Debt -0.038** -0.037** -0.015 -0.042*** -0.016
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Trade with G5 0.124* 0.139
(0.07) (0.09)
G5 Bank Exposure 0.014 0.025
(0.04) (0.05)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 129 129 115 117 103
Countries 51 51 47 47 43
R-squared 0.53 0.54 0.50 0.60 0.51
Dependent variable is the requested fiscal adjustment by the IMF.
Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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The partial effect of Public Debt is statistically significant and negative in most cases
(though not in the regression with the full set of controls). This is surprising since one should
expect larger requirements of fiscal adjustment when debt levels increase over time. Indeed,
as found in Ilzetzki et al. (2013), fiscal stimulus can actually be counterproductive when
debt-to-GDP ratio is too high.
Last but not least, we also observe that the political proximity variable is in most cases
insignificant, as well as the variables measuring economic linkages between a country and G5
members.
4.3 Robustness
As a first robustness test, we estimate the relation in (1) using the final year of each program
and not year t + 1 to compute the fiscal adjustment variable. The results, shown in Table
7 in the Appendix, are actually stronger. The effect of an increase in tax revenues of a
percentage point varies between −0.498% and −0.792%. The effect of a one-percent increase
in government spending varies between 0.392% and 0.628%. We find it reassuring that our
results also hold with a different specification.
We also run the same regression using a random effects approach. The results, presented
in Table 8 in the Appendix, are qualitatively similar but smaller in magnitude. That might
reflect the issues discussed in Section 3: the IMF might require a smaller fiscal adjustment
from countries that find it easier to smooth the burden of taxation over time. Nevertheless,
the results are consistent with the view that the IMF prescribes fiscal adjustment aiming at
restoring budget discipline.
We also estimate the determinants of the number of conditionaliaties using a OLS model
instead of the Poisson specification. The latter is more appropriated when the dependent
variable is skewed (as ours), but the main result does not rely on the Poisson specification. In
particular, the variable Votes has a strong effect on the number of fiscal conditions, reinforcing
the evidence that political proximity of a country to G5 members is an important determinant
of the number of conditions. The results are available upon request.
Estimating the determinants of requested fiscal adjustments in a panel of heterogeneous
countries, as we have done so far, constraints slope coefficients to be the same in all countries.
However, IMF lending facilities differ substantially. In particular, programs designed to assist
low-income countries also give high weights to other issues rather than macroeconomic adjust-
ments - mitigation of social inequality, poverty reduction, and pro-growth oriented reforms.
To cope with this problem, we reestimate our baseline model in (1) excluding low-income
16
countries.21
Results are reported in Table 9 and confirm the previous results: the size of the requested
fiscal adjustment increases in the fiscal deficit. The magnitude of coefficients is a bit smaller
but still similar to those reported in our baseline regression. We obtain opposite results for
the effects of the economic linkages of a country to G5 members: the fiscal adjustment is
stronger when bilateral trade increases over time in a given country (Model 3 and 5) but
smaller when G5 banks’ claims increase (Models 4 and 5). Finally, the political proximity
variable remains statistically insignificant in almost all specifications.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper studies how economic and political variables affect two different measures of strin-
gency of IMF conditionalities: the sheer number of conditionalities and the fiscal adjustment
requested by the IMF. We find a very small correlation between those two measures. They
can thus be seen as two different indicators.
As previously found in the literature, political proximity of the borrowing country to the
Fund’s major shareholders has an important effect on the number of conditions requested by
the IMF. However, the fiscal adjustment requested by the IMF is mainly determined by a
country’s fiscal deficit and is not significantly affected by the political variable. One of the
most important conditions in IMF agreements, perhaps the most relevant and controversial
one, is mainly driven by economics not by politics.
21Classification follows World Bank criteria, which establishes thresholds determined by gross national income per capita, in
U.S. dollars. We exclude low-income countries rather than concessional loans due to data availability. In our sample, not all
low-income countries have concessional loans (and vice-versa).
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Table 7: The determinants of the requested fiscal adjustment
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Votes 0.037 0.072* 0.039 0.083*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Current Account -0.039 -0.034 -0.168*** 0.030 -0.179**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
Monetary Expansion -0.009 -0.008 -0.032 -0.007 -0.030
(0.006) (0.006) (0.02) (0.005) (0.03)
GDP Growth 0.015 0.041 -0.065 0.025 -0.078
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12)
Gov.Consumption 0.593** 0.621** 0.392** 0.628** 0.450*
(0.23) (0.23) (0.19) (0.27) (0.22)
Tax Revenue -0.779*** -0.792*** -0.508*** -0.770*** -0.498***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17)
Public Debt -0.032** -0.031** -0.0197 -0.034** -0.019
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Trade with G5 0.136* 0.156
(0.07) (0.10)
G5 Bank Exposure -0.008 -0.008
(0.03) (0.05)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 129 129 115 117 103
Countries 51 51 47 47 43
R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.62 0.58
Dependent variable is the requested fiscal adjustment (end of program) by the IMF.
Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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B Fiscal adjustment by IMF Program
Table 10: Fiscal Balances by Program
Country Year of Approval Fiscal Balance (T-1) Fiscal Balance (T+1)
GREECE 2010 / 2012 -13.58 / -9.29 -7.58 / -4.62
TURKEY 1999 / 2005 -7.80 / -10.54 -12.60 / -6.65
ARGENTINA 2000 / 2003 -2.50 / -3.27 na / -3.27
BRAZIL 2001 / 2002 -3.20 / -5.23 na / -2.69
COLOMBIA 1999 / 2003 / 2005 -3.90 / -5.19 / -1.97 -3.60 / -4.47 / -3.79
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 2003 / 2005 / 2009 -2.10 / -2.19 / -4.58 -1.10 / 0.70 / -4.05
ECUADOR 2000 / 2003 -6.00 / 2.90 -3.00 / 0.80
EL SALVADOR 2009 / 2010 -1.86 / -5.55 -1.61 / -3.58
GUATEMALA 2002 / 2003 / 2009 -2.91 / -1.45 / -0.46 -2.04 / -0.76 / -2.00
HONDURAS 1999 / 2004 / 2008 / 2010 -3.20 / -4.90 / -0.91 / -4.62 na / -4.80 / -0.23 / -3.10
NICARAGUA 2003 / 2007 -4.40 / -3.48 -1.80 / -2.38
PERU 1999 / 2001 / 2004 / 2007 -0.80 / -2.60 / -2.60 / 0.31 -1.00 / -1.00 / -2.40 / -0.67
URUGUAY 1999 / 2000 / 2002 / 2005 -1.00 / -3.80 / -3.17 / -2.95 -1.30 / -1.20 / -1.29 / -2.45
DOMINICA 2002 / 2003 -2.09 / -9.04 -2.04 / -4.98
JORDAN 1999 / 2002 / 2012 -6.90 / -3.67 / -5.74 -2.90 / -4.29 / -5.48
SRI LANKA 2001 / 2003 / 2009 -9.40 / -8.00 / -7.51 -6.30 / -4.98 / -5.83
PAKISTAN 2000 / 2001 / 2008 -6.50 / -4.00 / -3.99 na / -2.70 / -4.03
DJIBOUTI 1999 / 2008 0.90 / -2.57 0.70 / -1.85
BURUNDI 2004 / 2008 / 2012 -6.24 / 1.05 / -2.50 -4.01 / 1.05 / -3.99
CAPE VERDE 2002 / 2006 / 2010 -3.97 / -2.87 / -6.31 -6.98 / -4.34 / -11.01
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 2006 / 2012 12.18 / -2.39 15.14 / 0.49
CHAD 2000 / 2005 -5.40 / -2.16 -6.40 / -2.04
BENIN 2000 / 2005 / 2010 -2.30 / -1.05 / -4.13 0.60 / -2.51 / -2.41
GAMBIA, THE 2002 / 2012 -3.11 / -4.37 0.11 / -2.49
GUINEA-BISSAU 2000 / 2010 -9.90 / -4.10 -13.70 / -1.49
GUINEA 2001 / 2012 -3.20 / -2.95 -1.30 / -3.42
COTE D’IVOIRE 2002 / 2009 / 2011 -1.17 / -0.78 / -2.30 -0.71 / -1.65 / -4.44
KENYA 2000 / 2003 0.10 / -4.13 0.50 / -2.59
MALAWI 2000 / 2005 / 2008 / 2010 / 2012 -5.00 / -5.89 / -3.12 / -5.97 / -5.00 0.00 / -0.81 / -2.45 / -1.76 / -1.99
MALI 1999 / 2004 / 2008 / 2011 -2.40 / -3.80 / -3.75 / -2.67 -3.20 / -5.13 / -3.15 / -2.87
MAURITANIA 1999 / 2003 / 2006 / 2010 4.00 / 8.78 / -7.04 / -5.13 2.80 / -0.14 / -6.74 / -4.20
MOZAMBIQUE 1999 / 2004 / 2007 / 2010 -2.30 / -3.19 / -1.25 / -5.57 -3.50 / -3.73 / -3.31 / -7.24
NIGER 2000 / 2005 -5.90 / -4.51 -4.70 / -2.71
NIGERIA 2000 / 2005 -7.70 / -7.67 -1.90 / 17.36
SIERRA LEONE 2006 / 2010 -1.94 / -3.16 -0.35 / -4.74
TANZANIA 2003 / 2007 / 2010 / 2012 -4.35 / -5.72 / -4.12 / -5.94 -3.98 / -3.82 / -5.56 / -5.49
UGANDA 2002 / 2006 / 2010 -2.62 / -0.70 / -1.89 -2.68 / -1.74 / -3.19
BURKINA FASO 1999 / 2003 / 2007 / 2010 -2.90 / -5.49 / -15.97 / -4.74 -5.10 / -3.67 / -5.68 / -3.79
ZAMBIA 1999 / 2004 -7.10 / -6.46 -5.80 / -2.48
ARMENIA 2001 / 2005 -6.40 / -1.69 -2.50 / -2.69
ALBANIA 2002 / 2006 -8.29 / -3.77 -7.54 / -3.49
GEORGIA 2001 / 2004 / 2010 -4.60 / -2.30 / -3.64 -0.60 / -0.50 / -3.00
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 2001 / 2005 / 2011 -9.70 / -4.22 / -6.50 -4.90 / -3.70 / -7.10
MOLDOVA 2000 / 2006 / 2010 -5.30 / 1.73 / -15.12 -3.50 / -0.48 / -4.97
UKRAINE 2004 / 2008 / 2010 -1.14 / -2.00 / -6.25 -1.09 / -4.54 / -3.50
LATVIA 1999 / 2001 -0.80 / -3.30 -1.90 / -0.90
LITHUANIA 2000 / 2001 -8.60 / -2.80 na / -1.30
MONGOLIA 2001 / 2009 -6.80 / -4.98 -7.10 / -4.04
CROATIA 2001 / 2003 / 2004 -6.50 / -6.57 / -5.50 -4.20 / -4.47 / -3.70
MACEDONIA 2000/ 2005 0.00 / 0.75 -1.20 / -0.65
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 2002 / 2009 / 2012 -6.10 / -3.99 / -3.09 -6.00 / -3.94 / -2.35
ROMANIA 1999 / 2001 / 2004 / 2009 / 2011 -3.30 / -4.00 / - 2.30 / -4.89 / -6.55 -1.10 / -3.00 / - 1.84 / -3.62 / -3.00
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C Data description and source
Table 11: Data Description
Variable Description Source
Number of Conditions Total number of conditions in a program MONA/IMF
Number of Fiscal Conditions Number of fiscal conditions in a program MONA/IMF
Fiscal Adjustment Difference between fiscal balances in percentage of GDP MONA/IMF
Votes Vote compliance with G5 countries at UNGA Strezhnev and Voeten
Current Account Balance All transactions other than those in financial and capital items WEO/IMF
Monetary Expansion Average annual growth rate in money and quasi money World Bank
GDP Growth Real GDP (annual) growth WEO/IMF
Public Debt Gross public debt, percent of GDP IMF
Government Consumption Cash payments in providing goods and services WEO/IMF
Tax Revenue Taxes, social contributions, grants receivable, and other revenue WEO/IMF
Trade with G5 Country’s bilateral trade with G5 members in over GDP UN Comtrade
G5 Bank Exposure Total G5 banks’ claims over GDP BIS
Trade Openness Sum of exports and imports of goods and services over GDP Unctad
Population 0-64 Population between the ages 0 to 14 as a percentage of the total World Bank
Population 15-64 Population between the ages 15 to 64 as a percentage of the total World Bank
D Greece - Letter of Intent (May,2014)
Quantitative Performance Criteria
• Floor on the modified general government primary cash balance.
• Ceiling on state budget primary spending.
• Ceiling on the overall stock of central government debt.
• Ceiling on the accumulation of new external payments arrears on external debt contracted
or guaranteed by general government.
• Ceiling on the stock of domestic arrears.
• Floor on privatization receipts.
Structural Benchmarks
• Ministry of Finance to produce a comprehensive list of nuisance taxes and levies, and
eliminate them or transfer them (and the associated spending) to the central government
budget.
• Adopt VAT reform to streamline rates and simplify administration.
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• Adopt legislation on a new property tax regime.
• Government to meet quarterly performance indicators (KPIs) for revenue administration.
• Government to meet quarterly performance indicators for public financial management.
• Adopt legislation to reform the system of social security contributions to: (i) broaden the
contribution base; (ii) simplify the contribution schedule across the various funds; and
(iii) reduce contribution rates by 3.9 percentage points. The reforms will be fully phased
in by January 1, 2016 and will be revenue neutral and preserve the actuarial balance of
the various funds.
Prior Actions
• Government to lock in lower spending of 320 million euros from permanent savings in
2013 by revising binding expenditure ceilings in the 2015-18.
• Implement several measures to eliminate RES debt by end-2014.
• Government to place additional public sector employees in the mobility scheme to reach
25,000 employees, and to achieve 5,000 exits in the public sector .
• Adopt secondary legislation to the Income Tax Code and the Tax Procedure Code.
• Abolish 40 charges with an annualized cost of 245 million euros.
• Adopt 237 of the OECD recommendations to remove barriers to competition in four
sectors (tourism, retail, building materials, and food processing).
• Adopt legislation to reduce minimum wage for long-term unemployed.
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